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Cascading DoS Attacks on IEEE 802.11 Networks
Liangxiao Xin, David Starobinski, and Guevara Noubir
Abstract—We unveil the existence of a vulnerability in Wi-
Fi (802.11) networks, which allows an adversary to remotely
launch a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack that propagates both in
time and space. This vulnerability stems from a coupling effect
induced by hidden nodes. Cascading DoS attacks can congest an
entire network and do not require the adversary to violate any
protocol. We demonstrate the feasibility of such attacks through
experiments with real Wi-Fi cards, extensive ns-3 simulations,
and theoretical analysis. The simulations show that the attack
is effective both in networks operating under fixed and varying
bit rates, as well as ad hoc and infrastructure modes. To gain
insight into the root-causes of the attack, we model the network
as a dynamical system and analyze its limiting behavior and
stability. The model predicts that a phase transition (and hence
a cascading attack) is possible when the retry limit parameter
of Wi-Fi is greater or equal to 7, and characterizes the phase
transition region in terms of the system parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) is a technology widely used to access
the Internet. Wi-Fi connectivity is provided by a variety of
organizations operating over a shared RF spectrum. These
include schools, libraries, companies, towns and governments,
as well as ISP hotspots and residential wireless routers. Wi-
Fi traffic is also rapidly rising due to increased offloading by
cellular operators [1]. The importance of Wi-Fi networks and
the need to strengthen their resilience to intentional and non-
intentional interference have been recognized by companies,
such as Cisco [2].
Wi-Fi networks rely on simple, distributed mechanisms to
arbitrate access to the shared spectrum and optimize per-
formance. Such mechanisms include carrier sensing multiple
access (CSMA), exponential back-offs, and bit rate adapta-
tion. The behavior of these mechanisms in isolated single-
hop networks has been extensively studied and is generally
well-understood (see, e.g., [3]). However, due to interference
coupling, these mechanisms result in complex interactions in
multi-hop settings. As a consequence, different networks do
not always evolve independently, even if they are located far
away.
Figure 1 serves to illustrate this phenomenon at a high
level. Suppose that an attacker increases the rate at which it
generates packets, and transmits these packets in accordance
with the IEEE 802.11 protocol. These transmissions may cause
packet collisions at nodes concurrently receiving packets from
other sources. Due to the infamous hidden node problem,
which is hard to avoid in wireless networks, transmitters may
be unable to hear transmission by other nodes, even when
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Fig. 1: Illustration of a cascading denial of service attack.
Transmissions by an attacker impact nodes located far away,
due to interference coupling caused by hidden nodes.
using CSMA, and hence keep retransmitting packets until they
reach the so-called retry limit of the back-off procedure. These
retransmissions affect other neighbours and may propagate.
While an optional mechanism, called RTS/CTS, has been
designed to combat the hidden node problem, it increases
overhead and latency especially at high bit rates. Since the cost
of the RTS/CTS exchange usually does not justify its benefits,
it is commonly disabled [4], [5]. Indeed, most manufacturers
of Wi-Fi cards disable RTS/CTS by default and discourage
changing this setting as explicitly stated in [6]–[9]. Therefore,
most Wi-Fi systems today operate without RTS/CTS.
The coupling phenomenon induced by interferences creates
multi-hop dependencies, which an adversary can take advan-
tage of to launch a widespread network attack from a single
location. We refer to such an attack as a cascading Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attack. Cascading DoS attacks are especially
dangerous because they affect the entire network and do not
require the adversary to violate any protocol (i.e., the attacks
are protocol-compliant).
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we
unveil the existence of a vulnerability in the IEEE 802.11 stan-
dard, which allows an attacker to launch protocol-compliant
cascading DoS attacks. In contrast to existing jamming attacks,
the attacker does not need to be in the vicinity of the victims.
Second, we provide a concrete attack that exploits this
vulnerability in certain network scenarios. We demonstrate the
attack through experiments on a testbed composed of nodes
equipped with real Wi-Fi cards, and through extensive ns-3
simulations.
Third, we show the existence of a phase transition. When
the packet generation rate of the attacker is lower than the
phase transition point, it has vanishing effect on the rest of
the network. However, once the packet generation rate ex-
2ceeds the phase transition point, the network becomes entirely
congested. Thus, under a phase transition, the utilization of a
remote node experiences no change until it is suddenly forced
to congestion [10].
Finally, we introduce a new analytical model that sheds
light into the phase transition observed in the simulations and
experiments. We apply fixed point theorems to this model.
The analysis predicts for which values of the retry limit a
phase transition (and hence a cascading attack) can occur, and
explicitly characterizes the phase transition region in terms of
the system parameters. In particular, we show that a phase
transition can occur for the default value of the retry limit
in Wi-Fi, which is 7. We carry out a stability analysis and
demonstrate that in the phase transition region the system must
have multiple fixed points, one of which being unstable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we discuss related work. In Section III, we provide brief back-
ground on Wi-Fi, hidden nodes, and Minstrel, and introduce
our network model. We present and discuss experimental and
simulation results in Section IV. In Section V, we present an
analytical model that explains the behaviour of the network
and the impact of various parameters, and compare the ana-
lytical and simulation results. In Section VI, we conclude the
paper and discuss possible mitigation methods.
An earlier and shorter version of this paper appeared in the
proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Communications and
Network Security (CNS 2016) [11]. This journal version sig-
nificantly expands the theoretical analysis, including detailed
proofs of all the lemmas and theorems, and new results on sta-
bility analysis and heterogeneous traffic load, all of which can
be found in Section V. Moreover, new simulation results for
infrastructure networks, networks supporting RTS/CTS, ring
networks, networks based on a realistic indoor building model,
and networks with heterogeneous traffic load are presented in
Sections IV-B and V-H.
II. RELATED WORK
In general, the main goal of a DoS attack is to make
communication impossible for legitimate users. Within the
context of wireless networks, a simple and popular means to
launch a DoS attack is to jam the network with high power
transmissions of random bits, hence creating interferences
and congestion. Jamming at the physical layer, together with
anti-jamming countermeasures, have been extensively studied
(cf. [12] for a monograph on this subject).
More recently, several works have developed and demon-
strated smart jamming attacks. These attacks exploit protocol
vulnerabilities across various layers in the stack to achieve
high jamming gain and energy efficiency, and a low probability
of detection [13]. For instance, [14] shows that the energy
consumption of a smart jamming attack can be four orders
of magnitude lower than continuous jamming. The works
in [15], [16] show that several Wi-Fi bit rate adaptation
algorithms, such as SampleRate, ONOE, AMRR, and RARF,
are vulnerable to smart jamming. However, both conventional
and smart jamming attacks are usually non-protocol compliant.
Moreover, they require physical proximity. These limitations
can be used to identify and locate the jammer.
In contrast, in this work we show how a protocol-compliant
DoS attack can be remotely launched by exploiting coupling
due to hidden nodes in Wi-Fi. Rate adaptation algorithms
further amplify this attack due to their inability to distinguish
between collisions, interferences, and poor channels. One
potential mitigation is to design a rate adaptation algorithm
whose behaviour is based on the observed interference pat-
terns [17], [18]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
none of these rate adaptation algorithms are used in practice.
Our work is based on Minstrel [19], which is the most
recent, popular, and robust rate adaptation algorithm for Linux
systems.
The attacks that we are investigating bear similarity to
cascading failures in power transmission systems [20], [21].
When one of the nodes in the system fails, it shifts its load
to adjacent nodes. These nodes in turn can be overloaded and
shift their load further. This phenomenon has also been studied
in wireless networks. For instance, [22], [23] model wireless
networks as a random geometric graph topology generated by
a Poisson point process. They use percolation theory to show
that the redistribution of load induces a phase transition in
the network connectivity. However, the cascading phenomenon
that we investigate in this paper is different from cascading
failure studied in those works. In our work, the exogenous
generation of traffic at each node is independent. That is,
a node will not shift its load to other nodes. The amount
of traffic measured on the channel increases due to packet
retransmissions caused by packet collisions, rather than due
to traffic redistribution.
The work in [24], [25] show that interference coupling can
affect the stability of multi-hop networks. In the case of a
greedy source, a three-hop network is stable while a four-hop
network becomes unstable. In contrast, in our work, the path of
each packet consists of a single-hop. Thus, network instability
is not due to multi-hop communication in our case.
The work in [10], [26] show that local coupling due to inter-
ferences can have global effects on wireless networks. Thus,
[26] proposes a queuing-theoretic analysis and approximation
to predict the probability of a packet collision in a multi-hop
network with hidden nodes. It shows that the sequence of the
packet collision probabilities in a linear network converges to
a fixed point. The work in [10] evaluates the impact of rate
adaption and finds out that traffic increase at a single node can
congest an entire network, and points out the existence of a
phase transition.
Our paper differs in several aspects. First, it considers
an adversarial context, and shows how interference-induced
coupling can be exploited to cause denial of service. Second, to
our knowledge, it is the first work to demonstrate the existence
of such coupling on real commodity hardware. Third, our
simulations are based on a high-fidelity wireless simulator
(ns-3), capable of capturing the effects of rate adaptation
algorithms and accurately modeling infrastructure networks.
Finally, our analytical model is original and captures the
impact of the retry limit and traffic parameters. A key result is
that a cascading attack can be launched for the default value of
the retry limit in Wi-Fi, a result validated by the experiments
and simulations.
3III. BACKGROUND AND MODEL
We first review key aspects of IEEE 802.11 and then
describe the network model under consideration.
A. Wi-Fi Summary
Wi-Fi is a wireless local area network (WLAN) technology,
which mainly runs on 2.4 GHz ISM bands and 5 GHz
bands [5]. The IEEE 802.11 standard is a series of specifi-
cations, such as the media access control (MAC) and physical
layer (PHY) interfaces. The first 802.11 standard that gained
widespread success is 802.11b. It runs on 2.4 GHz bands and
has up to 11 Mb/s bit rate. The subsequent standards (e.g.,
802.11a, g, n, and ac) increased the bit rates using higher
order modulation along with coding, OFDM, MIMO, and
wider bands. It is noteworthy that 802.11b is the only mode
that supports communication at 1 Mb/s. Hence, when the bit
rate reduces to 1 Mb/s, Wi-Fi network reverts to the 802.11b
mode. Generally, this lower bit rate has higher resistance to
interference during transmission and is able to operate over
lower SNR channels.
The IEEE 802.11 standard uses a CSMA/CA mechanism
to control access to the transmission medium and avoid colli-
sions. After a packet is sent, a node waits for a short interframe
slots (SIFS) period to receive an ACK. Whenever the channel
becomes idle, the node waits for a distributed interframe space
(DIFS> SIFS) period and a random backoff before contending
for the channel. The random backoff consists of a random
number of backoff slots, which depends on the so-called
contention window. Specifically, at the r ≥ 1 retransmission
attempt (retry count), the contention window CWr is given by
CWr =
{
2r−1(CW1 + 1)− 1 CWr < CWmax,
CWmax otherwise.
(1)
The number of backoff slots is chosen uniformly at random in
the interval [0, CWr]. For IEEE 802.11b, the initial contention
window size is CW1 = 31 , the maximum contention window
size is CWmax = 1023, and the duration of a backoff slot
is 20 µs. Note that the case r = 1 corresponds to the initial
packet transmission attempt.
B. Hidden Node Problem
A typical instance of the hidden node problem is illustrated
in Figure 2. The figure shows three nodes: a transmitter, a
receiver and a hidden node. The dashed circle represents the
transmission range of the node. Since the transmitter and the
hidden node cannot sense each other, a collision happens when
both of them transmit packets at the same time.
A packet collision triggers a retransmission. In IEEE 802.11,
there is an upper limit on the number of retransmissions that
a packet can incur, called retry limit and denoted by R (the
default value is R = 7). If the retry count r of a packet exceeds
the retry limit, the packet is dropped, the retry count is reset to
r = 1, and a new packet transmission can start. The channel
utilization of a node increases with the probability of a packet
collision. In the worst case, the utilization can be R times
larger than in the absence of packet collisions. Therefore, the
Tx Rx
Hidden
node
Fig. 2: Classical hidden node problem. The transmitter and the
hidden node cannot sense each other. The collision happens
when they transmit simultaneously.
access channel of a node can easily be saturated if it is forced
to retransmit packets.
The hidden node problem can in principle be avoided by
enabling the RTS/CTS exchange, which is implemented in
Wi-Fi networks. However, the RTS/CTS exchange has not
only high overhead, but also does not always fully prevent
packet collisions [27] and may lead to deadlocks in multi-
hop configurations [28]. Generally, it is either turned off
[29] or only used for packets whose length exceeds the so-
called RTS threshold. Most manufacturers of Wi-Fi cards,
including Netgear [6], TP-LINK [7], Linksys [8] and D-
Link [9], disable RTS/CTS altogether by setting the RTS
threshold to a sufficiently high default value (e.g., 2346 bytes,
which corresponds to the maximum length of an IEEE 802.11
frame). They furthermore recommend to not change the default
setting.
C. Minstrel Rate Adaptation
Minstrel is a practical, state-of-the-art rate adaptation algo-
rithm that has been implemented within the MadWiFi project
and Linux mac80211 driver framework [19]. It chooses the bit
rate of a transmission based on the throughput measured over
past transmissions at different rates. Technically, it selects a
bit rate following a retry chain, as shown in Table I.
In Minstrel, 90% of the packets are transmitted at a “normal
rate” (fourth column in Table I). The remaining 10% are
transmitted at a “lookaround rate” (second and third columns
in Table I). Each packet is transmitted at a rate following a
retry chain (rows in Table I). For example, consider a packet
being transmitted at “lookaround rate”. If a random rate is
lower than the rate with “best throughput”, the packet is first
transmitted at the “best throughput” rate, then at the “random
rate”, then at the “best probability” rate, and finally at the
“lowest baserate”. The packet is dropped if the transmission
fails at the “lowest baserate”. The retry chain table is updated
10 times every second based on performance statistics.
Therefore, a large amount of packet loss does not neces-
sarily cause Minstrel to switch to a low bit rate. Another
advantage of Minstrel is that it probes the throughput of
different bit rates randomly. This makes the rate adaptation
more robust in complicated environment and against some
adversaries.
1The random rate is lower than the best throughput rate.
4TABLE I: Minstrel Retry Chain [19]
Try Lookaround rate Normal rate
random < best1 random > best
1 Best throughput Random rate Best throughput
2 Random rate Best throughput 2nd best throughput
3 Best probability2 Best probability Best probability
4 Lowest baserate Lowest baserate Lowest baserate
D. Network Model
The network model considered in this paper is shown in
Figure 3. This configuration could arise over different time
and space in more complex network topologies. We consider
N + 1 pairs of nodes. Each node Ai (i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., N )
transmits packets to node Bi. The dashed circle represents the
range of transmission. Node Bi+1 can receive packets from
both node Ai and node Ai+1. However, node Ai and node
Ai+1 cannot hear each other. That is, node Ai is a hidden
node with respect to node Ai+1 (and vice-versa). A packet
collision happens at node Bi+1 when packet transmissions by
node Ai and Ai+1 overlap.
We assume that all the nodes communicate over the same
channel. Note that there are only three non-overlapping chan-
nels in the 2.4GHz band. Hence, it is common that several
nodes use the same channel over time and space in crowded
areas.
E. Cascading DoS attack
Our goal is to investigate how node A0 can trigger a
cascading DoS attack, resulting in a congestion collapse over
the entire network. We start by increasing the packet gener-
ation rate at node A0. Node A0 transmits packets over its
channel, in compliance with the IEEE 802.11 standard. The
transmissions by node A0 cause packet collisions at node B1.
These collisions require node A1 to retransmit packets. The
increased amount of packet transmissions and retransmissions
by node A1 impact node A2 and so forth. If this effect keeps
propagating and amplifying, then the result is a network-
wide denial of service, which we refer to as a cascading
Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Because this attack is protocol-
compliant, it is difficult to detect or trace back to the initiator.
We note here that as a hidden node retransmits its packets,
it must back off after each retransmission, which leaves the
channel idle for a certain period of time. However, the duration
of the backoff period is generally too short to allow for
a successful transmission. Indeed, a packet transmission is
successful only if
1) The size of the contention window of the hidden node is
longer than the packet transmission time.
2) The transmitter starts and ends its transmission entirely
during the backoff period of the hidden node.
At 1 Mb/s, the transmission time of an 1500 bytes packet lasts
12 ms. This is longer than the contention window as long as
CWr < CWmax = 1023. Hence, by Eq. (1), a transmission
2This rate has the highest probability of resulting in a successful transmis-
sion.
...
A0 BiB0 B1 Ai
TransmitterReceiver
Bi+1 Ai+1
...
A1
AiBi
Fig. 3: Topology of the network. Node Ai transmits packets
to node Bi. Node Ai is a hidden node with respect to Ai+1.
cannot be successful during the backoff period preceding the
r < 6 retransmission attempt by a hidden node.
At the r ≥ 6 retransmission attempt by a hidden node Ai,
CWr = CWmax = 1023. Node Ai back-offs for n slots,
where n is an integer between 0 and 1023 that is picked
uniformly at random (i.e., with probability 1/1024). Since the
length of a backoff slot is 20 µs, the backoff delay is 0.02nms.
Without loss of generality, assume that node Ai starts backing
off at time t = 0 and ends its backoff at time t = 0.02n
(all the time units are in milliseconds). Node Ai then starts a
packet transmission, which ends at time t = 0.02n+ 0.12.
Node Ai+1 can transmit a packet successfully only if it
starts its transmission during the time interval [0, 0.02n− 12].
This requires n > 600. Assuming that the starting time of the
packet transmission by node Ai+1 is uniformly distributed in
the time interval [0, 0.02n+ 12], the probability that a packet
is successfully transmitted by node Ai+1 is
1023∑
n=600
1
1024
· 0.02n− 12
0.02n+ 12
= 0.059.
Thus, the likelihood of a successful packet transmission is low,
a result validated by the experimental and simulation results
of the next section.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate the feasibility of launching
cascading DoS attacks both through experiments and sim-
ulations. We first show results on an experimental testbed
using real Wi-Fi cards. We then use ns-3.22 simulations to
investigate how this attack can be performed in significantly
larger scale networks, and under different settings (ad hoc,
infrastructure, fixed bit rate, and adaptive bit rate).
A. Experiments
We set up an experimental testbed composed of six nodes.
The testbed configuration is shown in Figure 4. We establish
an IEEE 802.11n ad hoc network consisting of three pairs
of nodes. Each node consists of a PC and a TP-LINK TL-
WN722N Wireless USB Adapter. We use RF cables and
splitters to link the nodes, isolate them from external traffic,
and obtain reproducible results.
We place 70 dB attenuators on links between node Ai and
Bi (i ∈ 0, 1, 2), and 60 dB attenuators on links between
nodes Ai and Bi+1. The difference in the signal attenuation
of different links ensures that a packet loss occurs if a hidden
560dB
70dB
A0 A1 A2
B0 B1 B2
60dB
70dB 70dB
RF attenuattorSplitter
Fig. 4: Experimental testbed.
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Fig. 5: Throughput performance measurements in testbed.
When node A0 starts increasing its packet generation rate,
the throughput of nodes A1 and A2 vanishes.
node transmits. In practice, such a situation may occur if nodes
Ai and Bi+1 communicate without obstacles, while node Ai
and Bi are separated by an office wall [30]. The transmission
power of each node is set to 0 dBm. We use iPerf [31] to
generate UDP data streams and to measure the throughput
achieved on each node. The length of a packet is the default
IP packet size of 1500 bytes.
Figure 5 demonstrates the cascading DoS attack on the
experimental testbed. At first, the packet generation rates of
nodes A0, A1 and A2 are set to 400 Kb/s. We observe that
the throughput of all the nodes remains in the vicinity of 400
Kb/s during the first 300 seconds. After 300 seconds, A0 starts
transmitting packets at 1 Mb/s. As a result, the throughput of
nodes A1 and A2 suddenly vanishes. Once node A0 resumes
transmitting at 400 Kb/s, the throughput of node A1 and node
A2 recovers.
B. Simulations
In the previous section, we demonstrated the feasibility of
launching a cascading DoS attack on an experimental testbed.
This testbed relies on commercial cards that are black boxes
for all purposes. For instance, the driver of the Wi-Fi card and
the rate adaptation algorithm are closed-source. There are also
substantial usage restrictions, such as parameter settings.
In order to gain a better insight into the attack in large-
scale networks, we resort to ns-3 simulations, a state-of-the-
art simulator which includes high-fidelity wireless libraries.
We show the occurrence of cascading DoS attacks
1) In ad hoc networks with fixed bit rate;
2) In ad hoc networks under Minstrel rate adaptation;
3) In infrastructure networks;
4) In ring topology networks;
5) In an indoor scenario;
and the countering of cascading DoS attacks
6) In networks with RTS/CTS enabled.
1) Fixed bit rate: We first describe the occurrence of a
cascading DoS attack in an ad hoc network with fixed bit rate.
We consider a linear topology consisting of 41 pairs of nodes
(i.e. a sequence of 41 hidden nodes), as shown in Figure 3.
Each packet is transmitted over a single-hop path (similar to
Wi-Fi Direct). We fix the bit rate to 1 Mb/s and the retry limit
to R = 7.
We set up a Wi-Fi network using the standard IEEE 802.11
library in ns-3. At each node Ai, i ≥ 1, the generation rate
of UDP packets is λi = 8.125 pkts/s. The generation rate of
UDP packets at node A0, λ0, varies from 1.25 to 61.25 pkts/s.
Packets at each node are generated according to a Poisson
process, hence different nodes start transmitting at different
times. The size of each packet is 2000 bytes. Each node has
the same transmission power (40 mW). We set the propagation
loss between nodeAi andBi to 80 dB and the propagation loss
between node Ai and Bi+1 to 70 dB. We run each simulation
five times for 1,000 seconds, and average out the results.
The (exogenous) load at each node Ai is denoted ρi = λiT ,
where T represents the duration of each packet transmission
attempt (0.016 second in our case). The utilization of a node
Ai, denoted ui, is defined as the fraction of time the node is
busy transmitting bits on the channel.
Figure 6(a) depicts the utilization u1, u20, and u40 as
a function of ρ0, the load at node A0. The utilization of
node A1, u1, increases smoothly until it reaches its upper
limit. However, the utilizations of nodes A20 and A40 remain
low until u0 reaches a certain threshold around ρ0 = 0.5, at
which point u20 and u40 suddenly jump to a high value. This
sudden jump corresponds to a phase transition, and the critical
threshold represents the phase transition point.
Figure 6(b) illustrates the phase transition in a different way.
The figure depicts the utilization of each node Ai for i ≥ 1,
as i increases. Again, we observe that different values of ρ0
lead to two completely distinct behaviour for the sequence
of utilizations (ui)
40
i=0 (i.e., u40 ≃ 0.3 when ρ0 = 0.2 and
ρ0 = 0.4, while u40 ≃ 0.75 when ρ0 = 0.6 and ρ0 = 0.8).
Note that the upper limit of the utilization does not reach 1,
due to inter-frame spacing requirements and (random) backoff
delays mandated by IEEE 802.11.
2) Rate Adaptation: We next consider the same network
setting as in the previous section, but this time we assume
that nodes can transmit at different bit rates. We specifically
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(a) As the traffic load at node A0 increases, the utilization of remote
nodes (e.g., A20 and A40) exhibits a phase transition.
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(b) Utilization of nodes Ai (i ≥ 1) for different traffic loads at node
A0. The utilization converges as i gets large. When the load at node
A0 changes from 0.4 to 0.6, the sequence of utilization converge
to different limits, illustrating the phase transition.
Fig. 6: Occurrence of cascading DoS attacks in ad hoc
networks with fixed bit rate.
assume that nodes implement the Minstrel rate adaptation
algorithm. In this case, the attack works by coercing the rate
adaptation algorithm to reduce the bit rate to 1 Mb/s at each
node, thus leading to similar results to those shown in Section
IV-B1. In our simulations, the parameter EWMA of Minstrel
is set to 0.25 [32].
We set λ0 = 312.5 pkts/s and λi = 31.25 pkts/s (i ≥ 1)
for the packet generation rates. As shown in Figure 7, packet
transmissions at node A0 start after t = 100 s. During the
first 100 seconds, the throughput of nodes A20 and A40
remain around 0.5 Mb/s, which implies that all the packets
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Fig. 7: Simulation results with Minstrel rate adaptation. When
node A0 generates packets at 5 Mb/s and transmits, the
throughput of nodes A20 and A40 vanishes. The average bit
rates of nodes A20 and A40 also reduce to 1 Mb/s. This result
indicates that nodes A20 and A40 are transmitting packets
at the lowest bit rate, however with no throughput (all their
packets collide).
are received. Once node A0 starts transmitting packets, the
throughput of nodes A20 and A40 is brought down to close
to zero. We also observe that the bit rates at node A20 and
A40 go down to 1 Mb/s, due to the repeated packet collisions.
Once node A0 stops transmitting at t = 700 s, nodes A20 and
A40 recover.
3) Infrastructure networks: We next show that cascading
DoS attacks are also feasible in infrastructure networks. Since
the infrastructure mode is more widely used than ad hoc
in practice, the feasibility of the cascading DoS attack in
infrastructure networks increases its severity and potential
impact. We repeat the simulations of Section IV-B2 except that
we set nodesBi as access points, and nodes Ai as stations. The
initial beacon starting time at each AP is a random variable
that is uniformly distributed between 0 and 102.4 ms.
We first investigate the cases where stations do not restart
association when beacons are missing. Toward this end, we set
the number of consecutive beacons that must be missed before
restarting association, i.e. the attribute MaxMissBeacons in
ns-3, to a large value. Otherwise, we use the default settings
of ns-3 for the APs [33] and the stations [34]. Figure 8 shows
similar results as in Section IV-B2, namely when a cascading
DoS attack is launched by node A0, as shown in Figure 8(a),
the remote nodes A20 and A40 in the sequence exhibit a phase
transition. If the attacker is node A20, the simulation result in
Figure 8(b) shows that the throughput of node A40 vanishes
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(a) When node A0 generates packets at 5 Mb/s and trans-
mits, the throughput of nodes A20 and A40 vanishes.
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Fig. 8: Simulation results under AP mode without reassocia-
tion. Nodes Ai are stations and nodes Bi are access points,
for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
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Fig. 9: Simulation results under AP mode with reassociation.
When node A0 generates packets at 5 Mb/s and transmits, the
throughput of node A20 and A40 significantly decreases.
but the throughput of node A0 does not. This result shows that
an attack can be launched from any node Ai in the topology
and the following nodes in the sequence (i.e., Ai+1, Ai+2, . . .)
will experience congestion.
We next consider the case where stations restart association
when beacons are missing. We set MaxMissBeacons = 10,
which is the default value in ns-3 [34]. The simulation results
are shown in Figure 9. When Node A0 starts to transmit
packets, we observe a significant throughput degradation at
nodes A20 and A40, but the throughput does not vanish
completely. The reason is that if Ai disassociates from its
AP Bi over a certain period then node Ai+1 is not affected
by interference coupling during that period. This result indi-
cates that reassociations help mitigate cascading DoS attacks,
...
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Fig. 10: Ring topology under cascading DoS attack. The dash
circle represents the transmission range of the transmitter.
though throughput performance is still significantly impaired.
4) Ring topology: We investigate cascading DoS attacks
in a ring topology with 41 pairs of nodes, as shown in
Figure 10. In our previous results for linear topologies, the
effect of an attack disappears once the attacker reduces its
packet generation rate. However, the effect of an attack in
a ring topology can last for a long period of time after the
attack stops. Node Ai (i = 0, 1, . . . ) generate packets at rate
0.5 Mb/s, following a Poisson process. At time t = 300 s,
node A0 increases its packet generation rate to 11 Mb/s and
the throughput of all the nodes vanishes. Yet, unlike results
in linear topologies, the throughput of the nodes does not
recover after node A0 reduces its packet generation rate back
to 0.5 Mb/s. The cyclic nature of the topology reinforces the
attack even after the trigger stops.
This result is illustrated in Figure 11. During the first 100
seconds, all the nodes Ai (i = 0, 1, . . . ) generate packets at
0.5 Mb/s. At time t = 300 s, node A0 increases its packet
generation rate to 11 Mb/s. As a result, the throughput of
all nodes vanishes. Yet, unlike results in linear topologies, the
throughput of the nodes does not recover after nodeA0 reduces
its packet generation rate back to 0.5 Mb/s. The cyclic nature
of the topology reinforces the attack even after the trigger
stops.
5) Building model: In this section, we use the ns-
3 HybridBuildingsPropagationLossModel
library [35] to demonstrate the feasibility of cascading
DoS attacks in an indoor scenario. Models in this library
realistically characterize the propagation loss across different
spectrum bands (i.e., ranging from 200 MHz to 2.6 GHz),
different environments (i.e., urban, suburban, open areas), and
different node positions with respect to buildings (i.e., indoor,
outdoor and hybrid). The building models take into account
the penetration losses of the walls and floors, based on the
type of buildings (i.e., residential, office, and commercial).
In our simulations, we consider a 20-floor office building
with six rooms in each floor, as shown in Figure 12. We
assume that five pairs of Wi-Fi nodes (Ai, Bi) are active in
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Fig. 11: Simulation results under a ring topology. When the
packet generation rate of node A0 increases, the throughput of
nodes A20 and A40 vanishes. This effect continues even when
the packet generation rate of node A0 decreases.
the building, where node Ai transmits packets to nodes Bi
(i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4). The bit rate is set to 1 Mb/s, the retry limit
to R = 7, and the frequency to 2.4 GHz. The generation rate
of UDP packets at nodes Ai, i ≥ 1, is λi = 8.125 pkts/s.
Packets are 2000 bytes long.
We turn on and off transmissions at node A0 to observe how
it impacts the throughput of other nodes. Simulation results
are shown in Figure 13. When node A0 does not transmit,
the throughput of node A4 is 0.13 Mb/s and it incurs no
packet loss. However, when node A0 starts transmitting, the
throughput of node A4 collapses. The throughput of node A4
recovers only after node A0 stops transmitting.
6) RTS/CTS: We next evaluate the impact of enabling
RTS/CTS in the topology under consideration. Specifically, we
repeat the simulations of Section IV-B2, but with RTS/CTS
enabled. Figure 14 shows that transmissions by node A0,
which start after 100 s, have no effect on the throughput
of remote nodes A20 and A40. This shows that RTS/CTS
is an effective solution against cascading DoS attacks in this
scenario.
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, we develop a stylized, analytical model
that provides qualitative insight into the network behavior
observed in the simulations and experiments for the linear
topology. Specifically, our goal is to explain why and under
what conditions the phase transition occurs, and shed light into
the roles played by the retry limit R and the traffic load at the
different nodes.
A. Model
We consider the linear topology shown in Figure 3. Packet
generations at each node Ai form a Poisson process with
rate λi. The packet size is fixed and the duration of each
packet transmission attempt is T (we assume a fixed bit rate).
A transmission by node Ai+1 is successful only if does not
overlap with any transmission by (hidden) node Ai.
If a packet collides, it is retransmitted until either it is
successfully received or the retry count reaches the limit R.
Let 1 ≤ ri ≤ R represent the mean retry count at node Ai.
Note that the initial packet transmission is included in that
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Fig. 12: Office building model. The building has 20 floors
(z-axis) and 6 rooms in each floor (x and y axes).
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Fig. 13: Simulation results using ns-3 building model. When
node A0 transmits, the throughput of remote node A4 col-
lapses.
count. Then, the mean service time of a packet at node Ai
is riT . To keep the analysis tractable, timing details of Wi-
Fi, such as DIFS, SIFS, and back-off inter-frame spacing are
ignored. Therefore the upper limit of the utilization equals 1
in our analysis.
We denote the utilization of node Ai by 0 ≤ ui ≤ 1,
where ui represents the fraction of time node Ai transmits.
If ui = 1, node Ai is congested and transmits continuously.
Otherwise, node Ai is uncongested and transmits packets at
rate riλ. Therefore, the utilization of node Ai for all i ≥ 0 is
ui = min{riλiT, 1}. (2)
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Fig. 14: Simulation results when enable RTS/CTS. The in-
crease of the packet generation rate of node A0 does not affect
the throughput of nodes A20 and A40.
Note that there is no retransmission at node A0 and r0 = 1.
Our model represents a special case of interacting queues,
which are notoriously difficult to analyze [36]. To make the
analysis tractable, we assume that:
1) Packet transmissions and retransmissions at each uncon-
gested node Ai form a Poisson process with rate riλ.
2) The probability that a packet transmitted by node Ai col-
lides is independent of previous attempts. This probability
is denoted pi.
Though the assumption of Poisson retransmissions is not
fully consistent with the Wi-Fi protocol, it is similar to the
“random-look” model used by Kleinrock and Tobagi in their
analysis of (single hop) random access networks [37] (see
also [38][Ch. 4]). The simulations do not incorporate the
simplifications used to make the analysis tractable, yet lead
to the same effects. We stress that beside these assumptions,
the rest of our analysis is exact.
B. Iterative analysis of the utilization
Our goal is to find the utilization at each node i ≥ 0 and in
the limit as i→∞. We consider the same scenario as in our
simulations, whereby node A0 (the attacker) varies its traffic
load
ρ0 , λ0T, (3)
while all other nodes Ai (i ≥ 1) have the same traffic load
ρ , λiT, (4)
where 0 < ρ < 1. We aim to understand if and how changes in
the value of ρ0 affect the utilization of nodes that are located
far away as function of the parameters ρ and R.
First, we get the utilization at node A0:
u0 = min{ρ0, 1}. (5)
We next develop an iterative procedure to derive ui+1 from
ui. From (2) and (4),
ui+1 = min{ri+1ρ, 1}. (6)
We first relate ri+1 to pi+1, the probability that a packet
transmitted by node Ai+1 collides. Based on Assumption 2,
the probability that a packet is successfully received after 1 ≤
r ≤ R attempts is (1 − pi+1)(pi+1)r−1 while the probability
that a packet fails to be received after R attempts is (pi+1)
R.
Hence, the mean retry count at node Ai+1 is
ri+1 =
R∑
r=1
r · (1 − pi+1) · (pi+1)r−1 +R · (pi+1)R
=
R∑
r=1
(pi+1)
r−1. (7)
We next relate pi+1 to ui. First, suppose ui < 1 (i.e., node
Ai is uncongested). Assume that node Ai+1 starts a packet
transmission (or retransmission) at some arbitrary time t = t′.
We compute pi+1 by conditioning on whether or not node Ai
is transmitting at time t′. Note that due the Poisson Arrivals
See Time Averages (PASTA) property, the transmission state
of node Ai at time t = t
′ is the same as at any random point
of time.
If node Ai transmits at time t
′, which occurs with proba-
bility ui, then the packet transmitted by node Ai+1 collides
with probability 1. If node Ai does not transmit at time
t′, which occurs with probability 1 − ui, then a collision
occurs only if node Ai starts a transmission during the interval
[t′, t′+T ]. Since the packet inter-arrival time on the channel is
exponentially distributed with mean riT , such an event occurs
with probability
(1 − e−riλiT ) = (1 − e−ui), (8)
based on Assumption 1. Therefore, the unconditional proba-
bility that a packet transmitted by node Ai+1 collides is
pi+1 = 1 · ui + (1− e−ui) · (1− ui)
= 1− e−ui(1− ui). (9)
Next, suppose ui = 1 (i.e., node Ai is congested). In that
case, all the transmissions by node Ai+1 collide and pi+1 = 1.
We note that (9) still provides the correct result.
Putting (6), (7), and (9) together, we obtain
ui+1 = min
{
ρ
R∑
r=1
(
1− e−ui(1− ui)
)r−1
, 1
}
. (10)
C. Limiting behaviour of the utilization
We next analyze the limiting behaviour of the iteration
given by (10). The sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 corresponds to a discrete
non-linear dynamical system [39]. Such systems are generally
complex as they may converge to a point, to a cycle (i.e., they
exhibit periodic behaviour), or not converge at all (i.e., they
exhibit chaotic behaviour).
The main result of this section is to show that the sequence
(ui)
∞
i=0 always converges to a point. However, the limit
depends on the initial utilization u0.
To simplify notation, we define the function
f(ui) , ρ
R∑
r=1
(
1− e−ui(1− ui)
)r−1
. (11)
We then rewrite (10) as follows:
ui+1 = min {f(ui), 1} . (12)
10
We say that ω ∈ [0, 1] is a fixed point of (12) if
ω = min {f(ω), 1} . (13)
Suppose (13) has K different fixed points (Theorem 2 in
the sequel will show that K ≥ 1). We denote by Ω the ordered
set of all the fixed points of (13). That is,
Ω , {ω1, . . . , ωk, . . . , ωK}, (14)
where ω1 < . . . < ωk < . . . < ωK .
We are next going to show that for any u0 ∈ [0, 1], the limit
of the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 is one of the elements in Ω. To prove
this result, we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Let u, u′ ∈ (ωk, ωk+1), where k ∈ {1, . . . ,K −
1}. If f(u) > u, then f(u′) > u′. If f(u) < u, then f(u′) <
u′.
Proof: The proof goes by contradiction. Let u, u′ ∈
(ωk, ωk+1). Suppose f(u) > u and f(u
′) < u′. Since f
is continuous in (ωk, ωk+1), then by the intermediate-value
theorem there exists a point u′′ between u and u′ such that
f(u′′) = u′′ . Thus, u′′ is a fixed point of (13). This contradicts
the fact that no fixed point exists between ωk and ωk+1.
We now present the main result of this section.
Theorem 1:
1) Let u0 ∈ (ωk, ωk+1), where k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}. If
f(u0) > u0, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to ωk+1.
If f(u0) < u0, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to ωk.
2) If u0 ∈ [0, ω1), the sequence (ui)∞i=0 converges to ω1.
3) If ωK < 1 and u0 ∈ (ωK , 1], the sequence (ui)∞i=0
converges to ωK .
Proof:
1) Let ωk < u0 < ωk+1, where k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}. Since
pi ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the function f is continuous and
monotonically increasing, f(ωk) < f(u0) < f(ωk+1).
Hence, according to (12) and (13), we get
ωk ≤ u1 ≤ ωk+1. (15)
Now, suppose u1 = f(u0) > u0. If u1 = ωk+1, then the
result is proven. If u1 < ωk+1, then by Lemma 1 and
Equation (15), we have u2 = f(u1) > u1. Applying
the same argument inductively, either there exists some
value M ≥ 2 such that ui = ωk+1 for all i ≥ M ,
or the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 is monotonically increasing and
upper bounded by ωk+1. According to the monotone con-
vergence theorem, the sequence converges. Since there
is no other fixed point between u0 and ωk+1 and f is
continuous, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 must converge to ωk+1.
The case u1 = f(u0) < u0 is handled similarly.
2) Similar to Lemma 1, one can show that if there exists
u ∈ [0, ω1) such that f(u) > u, then f(u′) > u′ for all
u′ ∈ [0, ω1). Since f(0) = ρ > 0, the sequence (ui)∞i=0
converges to ω1.
3) This is handled similarly to case 2.
D. Phase transition analysis
In the previous section, we showed that the limit of the
sequence of node utilizations (ui)
∞
i=0 must be one of the fixed
points in the set Ω. A phase transition represents a situation
where a small change of u0 leads to an abrupt change of the
limit. Specifically, we focus on the case when the limit jumps
to 1. Formally:
Definition 1 (Network congestion): A network is said to be
congested if (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to 1. Else, the network is said
to be uncongested.
Definition 2 (Phase transition): A network experiences a
phase transition if there exists a fixed point ω ∈ Ω, such that
if u0 < ω the network is uncongested, and if u0 > ω the
network is congested. We refer to ω as the phase transition
point.
We note that a phase transition can possibly occur only if
ωK = 1, since otherwise the network is never congested,
irrespective of u0.
A network must fall in one of the following three regimes:
1) The network is uncongested for all u0 ∈ [0, 1].
2) The network is congested for all u0 ∈ [0, 1].
3) A phase transition occurs.
Our goal in the following is to determine what regime prevails
under different network parameters.
For this purpose, we investigate the existence and properties
of solutions of (13). First, we investigate the case ω = 1.
Lemma 2: If ρ > 1/R, then
1) ωK = 1.
2) If K = 1, then for all u0 ∈ [0, ωK ] the sequence (ui)∞i=0
converges to ωK .
3) If K ≥ 2, then for all u0 ∈ (ωK−1, ωK ] the sequence
(ui)
∞
i=0 converges to ωK .
Proof:
1) Let ρ ≥ 1/R. We compute the RHS of (13) at ω = 1 and
obtain min{f(1), 1} = min{Rρ, 1} = 1, which proves
that a fixed point indeed exists at ω = 1.
2) If ρ > 1/R, then f(1) = Rρ > 1. Since f(1) > 1,
then for all u0 ∈ (0, ωK) , we have f(u0) > u0, based
on an argument similar to Lemma 1, and the sequence
(ui)
∞
i=0 converges to 1, following an argument similar to
Theorem 1.
3) This is handled similarly to Part 2.
Lemma 2 indicates that the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 can converge
to 1 (depending on u0), if ρ > 1/R. Besides this special case,
(13) can be rewritten
f(ω) = ω. (16)
We look for solutions of (16) that belong to the interval [0, 1].
Each such solution is an element of Ω.
Equation (16) is difficult to work with because it contains
two unknown variables, ρ and R. To circumvent this difficulty,
we introduce the function
hR(ω) ,
ρω
f(ω)
=
ω∑
R
r=1
(1− e−ω(1− ω))r−1
. (17)
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For each value of ρ, the solutions of (16) must satisfy
hR(ω) = ρ. (18)
We denote the maximum of hR(ω) by
hmax
R
, max
0≤ω≤1
hR(ω).
The following theorem establishes the prevailing network
regimes for different parameters.
Theorem 2:
1) If ρ < 1/R, then the network is uncongested for all u0 ∈
[0, 1].
2) If hmax
R
> 1/R and 1/R < ρ < hmax
R
, then a phase
transition occurs and the phase transition point is ωK−1.
3) If ρ > hmax
R
, then the network is congested for all u0 ∈
[0, 1].
Proof:
1) If ρ < 1/R, then Rρ < 1 and the utilization of each
node is always less than 1. Hence, for any u0 ∈ [0, 1], the
network is always uncongested. Note that since hR(0) =
0, hR(1) = 1/R, and hR is continuous, (18) must have
at least one solution (i.e., at least one fixed point exists).
2) Let ρ ∈ (1/R, hmax
R
). We know that hR(0) = 0 and
hR(1) = 1/R. Since the function hR is continuous, (18)
must have at least one solution (i.e, at least one fixed point
strictly smaller than 1 exists). Also, because ρ > 1/R, a
fixed point point at ω = 1 exists (i.e., ωK = 1), by Part
1 of Lemma 2. Thus, there are K ≥ 2 fixed points.
By Part 3 of Lemma 2, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to
ωK for all u0 ∈ (ωK−1, ωK ]. Moreover, by Theorem 1,
the limit of the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 is no larger than ωK−1
for all u0 ≤ ωK−1. Hence, a phase transition exists at
ωK−1.
3) If ρ > hmax
R
, then (16) has no solution. Moreover, since
ρ > hmax
R
≥ hR(1) = 1/R, we get ρ > 1/R. By Parts 1
and 2 of Lemma 2, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to 1
for any u0 ∈ [0, 1], and the network is always congested.
We next illustrate Theorem 2 for different values of R, using
Figure 15. First, consider R = 4 as shown in Figure 15(a).
Since hmax
R
= 1/R = 0.25, there exists no traffic load ρ for
which a phase transition exists. Either the network is always
uncongested (for ρ < 1/R), or it is always congested (for
ρ > 1/R).
Next, consider R = 7 as shown in Figure 15(b). There,
hmax
R
= 0.166 > 1/R = 0.143. Hence, a phase transition
occurs if ρ ∈ (0.143, 0.166). For instance, consider the case
ρ = 0.15. Then, the equation hR(ω) = ρ has two solutions.
Including the fixed point ω = 1 (since ρ > 1/R), the set Ω
has K = 3 fixed points: {ω1 = 0.265, ω2 = 0.777, ω3 = 1}.
Hence, by Theorem 2, the network is uncongested if u0 <
0.777, and congested if u0 > 0.777.
The case R = 10 also has a phase transition region, as
shown in Figure 15(c). Furthermore, the size of this region is
larger since (1/R, hmax
R
) = (0.1, 0.162).
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Fig. 15: Illustration of the different network regimes for
different values of R. For each value of ρ, the fixed points
are the solutions of hR(ω) = ρ. In addition, the fixed point
ω = 1 always exists when ρ > 1/R. A phase transition region
exists if the maximum of hR(ω), h
max
R
, is strictly greater than
hR(1) = 1/R.
E. Sufficient condition for phase transition
In the previous section, we showed that a phase transition
exists in the region 1/R < ρ < hmax
R
, if hmax
R
> 1/R.
In this section, we derive an explicit lower bound on hmax
R
,
which provides a simple condition for the existence of a
phase transition. First, we establish a relationship between the
derivatives of hR(ω) for different values of R, but a given
value of ω.
Lemma 3: For ω ∈ [0, 1], if there exists R∗ ≥ 1 such that
h′
R∗
(ω) ≤ 0, then h′
R
(ω) ≤ 0 for all R > R∗.
Proof: Let ω ∈ [0, 1]. Since
(
h−1
R
(ω)
)′
= − h
′
R
(ω)
hR(ω)2
, (19)
the sign of h′
R
(ω) is opposite to
(
h−1
R
(ω)
)′
. Hence, we
investigate the sign of
(
h−1
R
(ω)
)′
=
R∑
r=1
Ψ′
r
(ω), (20)
where
Ψr(ω) ,
(1− e−ω(1− ω))r−1
ω
. (21)
We check the sign of each term Ψ′r(ω) in (20), for r ∈
{1, 2, . . . , R}. For r = 1, we have
Ψ′1(ω) =
d
dω
(
1
ω
)
= − 1
ω2
< 0.
For r ≥ 2, we have
Ψ′r(ω) = −
e−ω (1− e−ω(1 − ω))r−2Φr(ω)
ω2
, (22)
where
Φr(ω) , −1 + eω + (3 − 2r)ω + (r − 1)ω2.
Clearly, the terms e−ω, (1− e−ω(1− ω))r−2 and ω2 in (22)
are all positive. Thus, the signs of Φr(ω) and Ψ
′
r
(ω) are
opposite.
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We next investigate the signs of the first and second deriva-
tives of the function Φ(ω). We have
Φ′
r
(ω) = eω + 3− 2r + 2(r − 1)ω, (23)
Φ′′r (ω) = e
ω + 2(r − 1) > 0, (24)
for all ω ∈ [0, 1] and r ≥ 2. From (24), we find that Φ′
r
(ω) is
monotonically increasing with ω.
For any r ≥ 2, we obtain from (23) that
Φ′r(0) = 4− 2r, (25)
Φ′
r
(1) = e+ 1. (26)
We distinguish between three possible cases regarding the
sign of Φr(ω):
1) For r = 2, Φ′2(0) = 0. Hence, Φ
′
2(ω) > 0. The function
Φ2(ω) is monotonically increasing with ω. Since Φ2(0) =
e− 1 > 0, Φ2(ω) is always positive.
2) For r = 3, Φ′3(0) < 0. The function Φ3(ω) first decreases
then increases as ω increases from 0 to 1. Since Φ3(0) =
0 and Φ3(1) > 0, the sign of the function Φ3(ω) turns
from negative to positive as ω increases from 0 to 1.
3) For r > 3, Φ′r(0) < 0. The function Φr(ω) first decreases
then increases as ω increases from 0 to 1. Since Φr(0) =
0 and Φr(1) < 0, the sign of the function Φr(ω) is always
negative.
Therefore, by (20), for any given ω ∈ [0, 1], the sign of the
function Φr(ω) turns from being positive to being negative as
r increases. Equivalently, the sign of the function Ψ′
r
(ω) turns
from being negative to being positive as r increases.
Thus, by (20), if
(
h−1
R
(ω)
)′
is nonnegative for R = R∗,
then it is also nonnegative for all R ≥ R∗. Equivalently,
by (19), if
(
h−1
R
(ω)
)′
is nonpositive for R = R∗, then it is
also nonpositive for all R ≥ R∗, which completes the proof.
Consider the function hR(ω) as R→∞:
h∞(ω) = (1−
(
1− e−ω(1− ω)))ω
= e−ω(1− ω)ω, (27)
and its derivative
h′∞(ω) = e
−ω(1 − 3ω + ω2). (28)
The next corollary is the logical transposition of Lemma 3.
Corollary 1: If h′∞(ω) ≥ 0, then h′R(ω) ≥ 0 for all R ≥ 1.
The following lemma establishes that the function hR(ω) is
always strictly increasing in the interval [0, ω), where
ω ,
3−√5
2
. (29)
Lemma 4: Let 0 ≤ ω < ω. Then, h′
R
(ω) > 0, for all R ≥ 1.
Proof: Let the function h∞(ω) and its derivative h
′
∞(ω)
be defined as in (27) and (28), respectively. Since e−ω is
always positive, h′∞(ω) has the same sign as (1 − 3ω + ω2).
The unique root of (1 − 3ω + ω2) = 0 for ω ∈ [0, 1] is w¯ as
defined in (29).
Thus, (1 − 3ω + ω2) is positive when 0 ≤ ω < ω, and so
is h′∞(ω). By Corollary 1, h
′
R
(ω) > 0 for 0 ≤ ω < ω and for
all R ≥ 1.
The consequence of Lemma 4 is that for all R ≥ 1,
hmax
R
≥ hR(ω). (30)
This equation provide a lower bound on hmax
R
that can easily
be computed. We then obtain the following sufficient condition
for the existence of phase transition.
Theorem 3: Let ω be defined as in (29) and suppose
hR(ω) > 1/R. Then, a phase transition is guaranteed to exist
for any ρ ∈ (1/R, hR(ω)).
Proof: From Theorem 2, we know that a phase transition
exists if 1/R < ρ < hmax
R
. By (30) and the assumption that
hR(ω) > 1/R, the proof follows.
The next theorem establishes an even more explicit lower
bound on hmax
R
.
Theorem 4: Let h∞(ω) and ω be defined as in (27) and
(29), respectively. Then, hmax
R
≥ h∞(ω) ≃ 0.161.
Proof: By (17),
hR(ω) =
ω∑R
r=1
(1− e−ω(1 − ω))r−1
>
ω∑∞
r=1
(1− e−ω(1 − ω))r−1 = h∞(ω). (31)
Thus, by (30) and (31), hmax
R
> h∞(ω) ≃ 0.161. Note that
this bound is asymptotically tight as R → ∞ since hmax∞ =
h∞(ω).
From Theorems 2 and 4, it follows that a phase transition
exists if 1/R < 0.161. Hence:
Corollary 2: A phase transition is guaranteed to exist for
R ≥ 7 and ρ ∈ [1/R, 0.161].
We note that the lower bound on hmax
R
is quite tight. For
instance, hmax7 = 0.166. Moreover, h
max
R
decreases with
R (this follows from (17), since for any ω ∈ [0, 1] the
denominator increases as R gets larger).
F. Stability of fixed points
In this subsection, we use stability theory to shed further
light into the limiting behaviour of the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0.
Specifically, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to stable fixed
points of Ω and diverges from unstable fixed points of Ω.
We will show that the stability of the fixed points of (16) are
determined by the sign of h′
R
(ω) at those points.
Informally, a fixed point ω is stable (or an attractor), if
there exists a domain containing ω, such that if u0 belongs to
that domain, then (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to ω.
Definition 3 (Stability of a fixed point): Let u0 ∈ [0, 1]. A
fixed point ω ∈ Ω is stable if there exists ǫ > 0 such that
if |u0 − ω| < ǫ, the sequence (ui)∞i=0 converges to ω. It is
unstable if for all u0 6= ω the sequence (ui)∞i=0 does not
converge to ω.
Recall that according to Lemma 2, a special fixed point of
(13) exists at ω = 1, if ρ > 1/R. According to Definition 3,
this fixed point is stable. Besides this special case, the rest
of the fixed points satisfy Equation (16). To establish the
stability of those fixed points, we will employ the following
proposition.
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Proposition 1 ( [39]): Suppose that a continuously differ-
entiable function f has a fixed point ω. Then, ω is stable if
|f ′(ω)| < 1 and unstable if |f ′(ω)| > 1.
The next theorem provides a criterion to establish the
stability of a fixed point ω ∈ Ω with respect to the function
hR(ω).
Theorem 5: Consider a fixed point ω ∈ Ω, where ω < 1.
Then ω is stable if h′
R
(ω) > 0 and unstable if h′
R
(ω) < 0.
Proof: Let ω ∈ Ω. The derivative of hR(ω) with respect
to ω is
h′
R
(ω) =
1
Γ(ω)
− ω
(Γ(ω))2
· Γ′(ω) > 0, (32)
where
Γ(ω) ,
R∑
r=1
(
1− e−ω(1− ω))r−1 = f(ω)
ρ
. (33)
If one can show that (32) implies |f ′(ω)| < 1, then according
to Proposition 1, the fixed point ω is stable. We multiply both
sides of (32) by (Γ(ω))2 and obtain
Γ(ω)− ωΓ′(ω) > 0. (34)
Using (33) and (16), we can rearrange (34) as follows:
Γ′(ω) <
Γ(ω)
ω
=
f(ω)
ρω
=
1
ρ
. (35)
From (33) and (35), we get
f ′(ω) = ρΓ′(ω) < 1.
Since f(ω) is monotonically increasing with ω, for ω ∈ [0, 1],
we conclude
0 < f ′(ω) < 1.
Hence, by Proposition 1, ω is a stable fixed point.
Similarly, h′
R
(ω) < 0 implies f ′(ω) > 1, which means that
ω is unstable.
We next show how the stability analysis of the fixed
points helps to determine the limit of the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0.
Consider, for instance, the example shown in Figure 16 with
parameters R = 10 and ρ = 0.13. Under these parameters,
Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} = {0.2, 0.7, 1}.
The fixed points ω1 and ω2 are the solutions of hR(ω) = ρ.
According to Theorem 5, ω1 is stable and ω2 is unstable. The
fixed point ω3 = 1 exists and is stable, since ρ > 1/R.
According to Theorem 2, ω2 is a phase transition point.
Hence, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to ω1 if u0 < ω2
and the network is uncongested. If u0 > ω2, the sequence
converges to ω3 and the network is congested.
G. Heterogeneous traffic load
In previous subsections, we assumed that node A0 varies its
traffic load ρ0, but all other nodes Ai (i ≥ 1) have the same
traffic load ρ. We now relax this assumption and assume that
nodes Ai (i ≥ 1) have different traffic loads ρi = λiT . We
next prove that a phase transition still occurs, as long as all
the traffic loads fall in the appropriate range.
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Fig. 16: Stability of fixed points with R = 10. Given a load
ρ = 0.13 (dash line), Ω contains three fixed points: ω1 = 0.2,
ω2 = 0.7 and ω3 = 1. The fixed point ω1 is stable because
h′
R
(ω1) > 0 and ω2 is unstable because h
′
R
(ω2) < 0. The
fixed point ω3 = 1 exists and is stable because ρ > 1/R.
Therefore, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to ω1 if u0 < ω2,
and to ω3 if u0 > ω2.
Theorem 6: Suppose hmax
R
> 1/R. If ρi ∈ (1/R, hmaxR ) for
all i ≥ 1, then a phase transition occurs.
Proof: Let ρmax = maxi≥1 ρi and ρmin = mini≥1 ρi.
According to Theorem 2, the network is uncongested when
ρ0 = 0 and the load at each node Ai is ρmax < h
max
R
. Hence,
the network must remain uncongested when the load at each
node Ai is smaller than ρmax.
Similarly, the network is congested when ρ0 = 1 and the
load at each node Ai is ρmin > 1/R. Hence, it must remain
congested when the load at each node Ai is larger than ρmin.
Thus, a phase transition occurs when 1/R < ρi < h
max
R
for
all i ≥ 1.
H. Comparison with simulation results
We compare the results of our analysis with ns-3 simula-
tions, for different settings of the retry limit R and load ρ. For
the simulations, we consider an ad hoc network composed of
41 pairs of nodes, as described in Section IV-B1.
1) Region of phase transition: To check whether a phase
transition exists for a given R, we run simulations both for
ρ0 = 0 and ρ0 = 1. If the node utilizations in the limit (i.e.,
for node A40) is the same in both cases, then we assume that
there is no phase transition. If the limits are different, then a
phase transition exists.
Figure 17 indicates that the existence of a phase transition
is related to the retry limit, as predicted by our analysis. For
the case R = 4, there is no phase transition, while a phase
transition occurs in the cases R = 7 and R = 10. in our
simulations for any R ≤ 6.
The analysis also reasonably approximates the phase tran-
sition region. For R = 7, the simulations show that a phase
transition exists if ρ ∈ (0.12, 0.16), while the analysis predicts
ρ ∈ (0.14, 0.17). For R = 10, the simulation results are
ρ ∈ (0.08, 0.14) while the analysis predicts ρ ∈ (0.10, 0.16).
We note that the size of the phase transition region increases
with R, as predicted by the analysis.
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Fig. 17: Simulation of the limiting behaviour of the node
utilization in a network of 41 pairs of nodes. For R = 4, the
limit is the same when ρ0 = 0 and ρ0 = 1, hence no phase
transition is observed. However, for R = 7 and R = 10, the
limits are different, hence showing the existence of a region
of load ρ in which a phase transition occurs.
2) Heterogeneous traffic load: We next show the feasibility
of a cascading DoS attack in a network where the traffic load
at different node is heterogeneous, in line with the analysis
of Section V-G. Specifically, the traffic load ρi at each node
Ai (i ≥ 1) is a continuous random variable that is uniformly
distributed between 0.11 and 0.15.
Figure 18 shows the simulation results for retry limit R = 7.
When ρ0, the load of node A0, is below 0.5, the network is
uncongested and the utilizations of nodes Ai oscillate around
0.35 as i gets large. Note that the sequence does not converge
to a fixed value due to the different traffic loads at the different
nodes. However, when ρ0 exceeds 0.6, the sequence of node
utilizations converges to its upper limit, implying that the
network is congested.
VI. CONCLUSION
We describe a new type of DoS attacks against Wi-Fi
networks, called cascading DoS attacks. The attack exploits
a coupling vulnerability due to hidden nodes. The attack
propagates beyond the starting location, lasts for long periods
of time, and forces the network to operate at its lowest bit
rate. The attack can be started remotely and without violating
the IEEE 802.11 standard, making it difficult to trace back.
We demonstrate the feasibility of such attacks, both through
experiments on a testbed and extensive ns-3 simulations. The
simulations show that the attack is effective in networks
operating under fixed and varying bit rates, as well as ad hoc
and infrastructure modes. We show that a small change in the
traffic load of the attacker can lead to a phase transition of the
entire network, from uncongested state to congested state.
We develop an iterative analysis to characterize the sequence
of node utilizations, and study its limiting behaviour. We show
that the sequence always converges to stable fixed points
while an unstable fixed point represents a phase transition
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Fig. 18: Simulation with heterogeneous traffic load in a
network with 41 pairs of nodes. The traffic load of nodes
Ai (i ≥ 1) are uniformly distributed between 0.11 and 0.15.
For R = 7, when the load ρ0 changes from 0.5 to 0.6, the
limiting behavior of the sequence of node utilizations differs,
thus indicating the occurrence of phase transition.
point. Based on the system parameters, we identify when the
system remains always uncongested, congested, or experiences
a phase transition caused by a DoS cascading attack.
The analysis predicts that a phase transition occurs for
R ≥ 7 and provides a simple and explicit estimate of traffic
load at each node under which a phase transition occurs (i.e.,
ρi ∈ (1/R, 0.161) for all i ≥ 1). The network is always
congested when the traffic load is above the phase transition
regime and always uncongested when the traffic load is below
the phase transition regime. Although the analysis is based on
some simplifying assumptions, the estimate is not far from the
values observed in the simulations.
Exploiting the coupling vulnerability in different network
configurations represents an interesting area for future work.
Experience in the security field indeed teaches that once a
vulnerability is identified, more potent attacks are subsequently
discovered (consider, for instance, the history of attacks on
WEP [40] and MD5 [41]). In our case, our simulations for
ring topologies indicate that the presence of a cycle in the
topology could reinforce cascading DoS attacks, a result that
warrants further investigations.
Several approaches are possible to mitigate cascading DoS
attacks. First, one could enable the RTS/CTS exchange, al-
though this solution has several drawbacks, including major
performance degradation under normal network operations,
as mentioned in the Introduction. Devising a scheme that
triggers RTS/CTS under certain circumstances (e.g., multiple
consecutive packet losses) could be an interesting area for
future research. The second approach is to lower the retry
limit. However, this could also negatively impact performance.
Other approaches include using short packets, collision-aware
rate adaptation algorithms, dynamic channel selection, and
full-duplex radios. We leave the investigation and comparison
of these mitigation techniques as possible areas for future
work.
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